Search Subsidies vs Hiring Subsidies: a General equilibrium Analysis of Employment Vouchers

Marco Fugazza ()

Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: In a two-sided search model, where the matching function is characterized by ex post match-specific heterogeneity and variable search intensity, the relative performance of search and hiring subsidies in terms of both cost effectiveness and aggregate efficiency is assessed.

Keywords: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; SUBSIDIES; SEARCHING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco99/16

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