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Simultaneous and Sequential Voting under General Decision Rules

Friedel Bolle

No 29, Discussion Paper Series RECAP15 from RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)

Abstract: In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the “true majority” (Groseclose and Milyo, 2010). If voting is sequential as in the roll call votes of the US Senate then, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the ”true majority” prevails (Groseclose and Milyo, 2013). It is shown that the result for sequential voting holds also with different weights of voters (shareholders), with multiple necessary majorities (EU decision making), or even more general rules. Simultaneous voting in the general model has more differentiated results.

Keywords: Voting; free riding; binary decisions; unique pure strategy equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
Date: 2018-05
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Forthcoming in Journal of Theoretical Politics

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https://www.europa-uni.de/de/forschung/institut/re ... ds/recap15_DP029.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules (2017) Downloads
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