Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2018, vol. 30, issue 4, 477-488
In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the â€˜true majorityâ€™ . If voting is sequential as in the roll call votes of the US Senate then, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the â€˜true majorityâ€™ prevails. It is shown that the result for sequential voting holds also with different weights of voters (shareholders), with multiple necessary majorities (European Union decision-making), or even more general rules. Simultaneous voting in the general model has more differentiated results.
Keywords: Binary decisions; free riding; unique pure strategy equilibria; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Simultaneous and Sequential Voting under General Decision Rules (2018)
Working Paper: Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:30:y:2018:i:4:p:477-488
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