Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability

Toke Aidt and Francesco Magris

No 04-18, Documents de recherche from Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of performance voting in solving the capital levy problem. In a representative democracy, voters can use elections to protect their property by holding politicians accountable for the tax policies they implement. We characterize the set of tax policies that can be sustained by symmetric performance standards and show when this set contains the second best (Ramsey) tax policy.

Keywords: Performance voting; capital taxation; time consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.univ-evry.fr/fileadmin/mediatheque/uev ... es/Epee/wp/04-18.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Capital taxation and electoral accountability (2006)
Working Paper: Capital taxation and electoral accountability (2006)
Working Paper: Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eve:wpaper:04-18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documents de recherche from Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Samuel Nosel ().