Capital taxation and electoral accountability

Toke Aidt and Francesco Magris

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Abstract: This paper investigates the role of performance voting in solving the capital levy problem. In a representative democracy, voters can use elections to protect their property by holding politicians accountable for the tax policies they implement. We characterize the set of tax policies that can be sustained by symmetric performance standards and show when this set contains the second-best (Ramsey) tax policy. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Capital taxation; Performance voting; Time consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in European Journal of Political Economy, 2006, 22 (2), pp.277--291. ⟨10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.06.007⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Capital taxation and electoral accountability (2006)
Working Paper: Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability (2004)
Working Paper: Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02877993

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.06.007

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