The Political Economy of Mass Privatisation and Imperfect Taxation: Winners and Losers
Rudiger Ahrend () and
Carlos Winograd ()
No 06-02, Documents de recherche from Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne
This article investigates the connection between the apparently uncorrelated issues of tax evasion and privatisation in a political economy framework. We first consider how the political process - given a country's level of development and income distribution- will affect the efficiency of the tax system. We then discuss the impact of the efficiency of the taxation system on the outcomes of privatisation. We consider under which condition privatisation will proceed, and who will be the political supporters as well as the main winners of the privatisation process. Moreover, we investigate the impact of di¤erent forms of corruption both on the initial public support for privatisation, as well as on its long term political sustainability.
Keywords: Privatisation; Taxation; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H21 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation: Winners and loosers (2006)
Working Paper: The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation: Winners and loosers (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eve:wpaper:06-02
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