The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation: Winners and loosers

Carlos Winograd and Rudiger Ahrend
Additional contact information
Carlos Winograd: EPEE - Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne, PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This article investigates the connection between the apparently uncorrelated issues of tax evasion and privatisation in a political economy framework. We first consider how the political process - given a country's level of development and income distribution - will affect the efficiency of the tax system. We then discuss the impact of the efficiency of the taxation system on the outcomes of privatisation. We consider under which condition privatisation will proceed, and who will be the political supporters as well as the main winners of the privatisation process. Moreover, we investigate the impact of different forms of corruption both on the initial public support for privatisation, as well as on its long term political sustainability.

Date: 2006-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Public Choice, 2006, 126, pp.201-224. ⟨10.1007/s11127-006-6499-8⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation: Winners and loosers (2006)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Mass Privatisation and Imperfect Taxation: Winners and Losers (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754185

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-6499-8

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().