Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs

Ata Atay and Marina Núñez ()

No 2017/357, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider a multi-sided assignment game with the following characteristics: (a) the agents are organized in m sectors that are connected by a graph that induces a weighted m-partite graph on the set of agents, (b) a basic coalition is formed by agents from different connected sectors, and (c) the worth of a basic coalition is the addition of the weights of all its pairs that belong to connected sectors. We provide a sufficient condition on the weights to guarantee balancedness of the related multi-sided assignment game. Moreover, when the graph on the sectors is cycle-free, we prove the game is strongly balanced and the core is described by means of the cores of the underlying two-sided assignment games associated with the edges of this graph. Moreover, once selected a spanning tree of the cycle-free graph on the sectors, the equivalence between core and competitive equilibria is established.

Keywords: Cooperative games; multi-sided assignment games; core; competitive equilibria. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs (2019)
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