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Let Me Vote! An experimental study of vote rotation in committees

R. Bosman, Philipp Maier (), Vjollca Sadiraj () and Frans van Winden ()

No 2006-18, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting increases a committeeâ??s efficiency, and (ii) the extent to which rotation is likely to critically influence collective and individual welfare. The experiment is based on the idea that voters have to trade-off individual versus common interests. Our findings indicate that the choice of a rotation scheme has important consequences: it â??paysâ?? to be allowed to vote, as voting committee members earn significantly more than non-voting members. Hence, rotation is not neutral. We also find that smaller committees decide faster and block fewer decisions. This reduces frustration among committee members.

JEL-codes: D70 D78 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2002-06, Revised 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

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http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2006-18.pdf First version, 2006 (application/pdf)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2013-07.pdf Revised version, 2013 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Let me vote! An experimental study of vote rotation in committees (2013) Downloads
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