Let me vote! An experimental study of vote rotation in committees

R. Bosman, Philipp Maier (), Vjollca Sadiraj and Frans van Winden ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 96, issue C, 32-47

Abstract: We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting improves a committee's performance, and (ii) the extent to which rotation critically influences collective and individual welfare. The experiment is based on the idea that voters have to trade-off between individual and common interests. Our findings indicate that the choice of rotation scheme has important consequences: it ‘pays’ to be allowed to vote, as voting committee members earn significantly more than non-voting members. Hence, rotation is not neutral. We also find that smaller committees decide faster and reach a deadlock less often. This reduces reported frustration among committee members.

Keywords: Decision making; Committee; Experiment; Voting; Rotation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726811300231X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Let Me Vote! An experimental study of vote rotation in committees (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:96:y:2013:i:c:p:32-47

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.09.003

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().