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Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Vjollca Sadiraj (), Jan Tuinstra () and Frans van Winden ()

No 2010-05, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: This short paper investigates the consequences of voters identifying with special interest groups in a spatial model of electoral competition. We show that, by effectively coordinating voting behavior, identification with interest groups leads to an increase in the size of the winning set, that is, the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Consequently, our paper points at a novel process through which interest groups can enhance the electoral chances of a challenger.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

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http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2010-05.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Identification of Voters with Interest Groups improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger (2009) Downloads
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