Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra and Frans van Winden ()

No 3014, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

Keywords: spatial voting models; electoral competition; winning set; interest groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger (2010)
Working Paper: Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger (2010)
Working Paper: Identification of Voters with Interest Groups improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3014

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