Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements
James Cox () and
Daniel Hall ()
No 2010-07, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University
Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al.  report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust games. We assign stronger property right entitlements by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota in a real effort task to earn their endowments. We find that cooperation is lower in common property trust games than in private property trust games, which is an idiosyncratic prediction of revealed altruism theory .
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Journal Article: Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements (2010)
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