Salient Rewards, Payoff Protocols and Biased Data

James C. Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj

No 2025-03, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: Paying salient rewards to subjects is expensive. Is it worth it? We describe previous data from otherwise identical treatments with hypothetical or salient payoffs that indicate opposite conclusions about the central research question in a paper. If we are going to pay salient rewards, how should we? The answer depends on the theoretical model underlying hypotheses being tested with the data, hence the choice of payoff protocol is an essential feature of experimental design. In recent years there has been renewed interest in theoretical and experimental research on properties of payoff protocols. We present an extension and critical discussion of the literature intended to promote uptake.

Keywords: Salient payoffs; Payoff protocols; Incentive compatibility; Random selection; Experimental procedures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2025-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2025-03

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