Auctions with external incentives: Experimental evidence
Miguel Fonseca (),
Francesco Giovannoni and
No 1602, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics
We consider auctions where bidders have external incentives and focus on the case where their valuations in the auction are positively correlated with their productivity which matters in a second stage job market. We study how this affects bidding behavior and wages in the job market and proceed to test the model’s implication in an experiment where treatments differ according to which bids are disclosed. Our results broadly confirm the theoretical prediction that bidders tend to overbid, and their bidding behavior and wages are influenced by the disclosure rule. The data also suggests that the dispersion in worker wages is affected by the disclosure rule, suggesting the importance of reputational bidding.
Keywords: Auctions; signaling; disclosure; experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-exp
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