Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence

Miguel Fonseca, Francesco Giovannoni () and Miltiadis Makris
Additional contact information
Francesco Giovannoni: University of Bristol

International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 4, No 5, 1003-1043

Abstract: Abstract We consider auctions where bidders’ valuations are positively correlated with their productivity in a second-stage aftermarket. We test in the lab whether bidders recognize the opportunity to signal their productivity through their bidding and, conditional on them doing so, whether disclosing different information about the auction outcomes affects their signaling behavior. Our results confirm that bidders recognize the signaling opportunities they face and also react to differences in the way their bidding behavior is disclosed, although not always in a way that is consistent with theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Auctions; Signaling; Disclosure; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-020-00725-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Auctions with external incentives: Experimental evidence (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00725-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00725-1

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().