An Instrument that Could Turn Crowding-out into Crowding-in

Antoine Beretti, Charles Figuieres and Gilles Grolleau ()

No 2014.04, Working Papers from FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists

Abstract: Using a simple decision-theoretic approach, we formalize how agents with different kinds of intrinsic motivations react to the introduction of monetary incentives. We contend that empirical results supporting the existence of a crowding-out effect in various contexts hide a more complex reality. We also propose a new policy instrument which taps into agents’ heterogeneity regarding intrinsic motivations in order to turn a situation subject to crowding-out into a crowding-in outcome. This instrument uses a self-selection mechanism to match adequate monetary incentives with individuals’ types regarding intrinsic motivations.

Keywords: Crowding-out; Heterogeneity; Moral motivation; Environmental regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D64 H23 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-env and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://faere.fr/pub/WorkingPapers/Berretti_Figuier ... _FAERE_WP2014.04.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: An instrument that could turn crowding-out into crowding-in (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fae:wpaper:2014.04

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