Models of Economically Rational Donators: Altruism Can Be Cruel

Jiri Hlavacek and Michal Hlaváček

No 63, Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies

Abstract: The paper shows that the donator’s altruism could have more forms. The particular form of his criterion influences significantly his decision about allocation of donations between recipients of the donation. Moreover, even under one criterion we could mention sudden change in strategy of the rational donator: This donator, even he is a “hard” altruist and favors the interests of the community over his own individual interests, could be forced by situation to “gambit”, so to the sacrifice of one subject in favor of the whole community. Preference of common interests over interests of the individuals could lead the donator to the liquidation of the (in other situation preferred) least resistant members of the community. Altruism can be cruel.

Keywords: altruism; optimal distribution of donation; probability of survival; Pareto-probability distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2004, Revised 2004
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