The Design of Syndicates in Venture Capital

Giacinta Cestone (), Josh Lerner and Lucy White ()
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Giacinta Cestone: UNIVERSITY OF SALERNO
Lucy White: UNIVERSITY OF SALERNO HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL

No 201037, Working Papers from Fundacion BBVA / BBVA Foundation

Abstract: We argue that the process whereby a venture capital syndicate is formed is characterized by two-sided asymmetric information, as the profitability signals held by different VCs are non-verifiable and manipulable. We analyze how an appropriate design of the syndicating VCs cash-flow rights can induce them to truthfully reveal their signals to each other. We then study how the incentive costs of syndication and the shape of financial claims vary with the VCs levels of expertise in evaluating entrepreneurial projects.

Keywords: Venture capital; syndication deals; asymmetric information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2006-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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