The Impact of Social Pressure on Tax Compliance: a Field Experiment
Pietro Battiston () and
No 2016-04, FBK-IRVAPP Working Papers from Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (IRVAPP), Bruno Kessler Foundation
We study the effect of social pressure on tax compliance, focusing on the compliance of shop sellers to the legal obligation of releasing tax receipts for each sale. We carry out a field experiment on bakeries in Italy, where a strong gap exists between the legal obligation and the actual behavior of sellers. Social pressure is manipulated by means of an explicit request for a receipt when not released. We employ an innovative approach to the identification of the treatment effect. We find that a single request for a receipt causes a 17 per cent rise in the probability of a receipt being released for a sale occurring shortly thereafter, causing on average more than two receipts to be released. We also find strong evidence of persistence in compliance decisions.
Keywords: Tax evasion; field experiment; peer pressure; social pressure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 H32 K34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-exp, nep-iue, nep-pub and nep-soc
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Journal Article: The impact of social pressure on tax compliance: A field experiment (2016)
Working Paper: Is Tax Compliance a Social Norm? A Field Experiment (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fbk:wpaper:2016-04
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