Empirical Implementation of Nonparametric First-Price Auction Models

Daniel Henderson (), John List, Daniel Millimet, Christopher Parmeter and Michael Price

Artefactual Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website

Abstract: Nonparametric estimators provide a flexible means of uncovering salient features of auction data. Although these estimators are popular in the literature, many key features necessary for proper implementation have yet to be uncovered. Here we provide several suggestions for nonparamteric estimation of first-price auction models. Specifically, we show how to impose monotonicity of the equilibrium bidding strategy; a key property of structural auction models not guaranteed in standard nonparametric estimation. We further develop methods for automatic bandwidth selection. Finally, we discuss how to impose monotonicity in auctions with differering number of bidders, reserve prices, and auction-specific characteristics. Finite sample performance is examined using simulated data as well as experimental auction data.

Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://s3.amazonaws.com/fieldexperiments-papers2/papers/00469.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Empirical implementation of nonparametric first-price auction models (2012)
Working Paper: Empirical Implementation of Nonparametric First-Price Auction Models (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:feb:artefa:00469

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Artefactual Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Francesca Pagnotta ().