Demand reduction in a multi-unit auction: Evidence from a sportscard field experiment: Reply

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, John List and David Reiley (david@davidreiley.com)

Framed Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website

Abstract: My coauthors and I reply to the comments of Daniel Levin on our paper "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment." In his comment, Levin presents new theory and proposes a new equilibrium to explain annomalies reported in our earlier sportscard auction, such as higher first-unit bids under the uniform-price institution. We evaluate his theory and equilibrium in the context of both uniform-price and Vickrey auctions and point out our concerns. Where possible, we attempt to test the predictions of his theory with our existing data.

Date: 2005
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Journal Article: Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment: Reply (2005)
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