One step at a time: Does gradualism build coordination?

Sam Asher (), Lorenzo Casaburi, Plamen Nikolov and Maoliang Ye

Framed Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website

Abstract: We study how gradualism -- increasing required levels ("thresholds") of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately -- affects individuals' decisions to contribute to a public project. Using a laboratory binary choice minimum-effort coordination game, we randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high threshold, starting at a low threshold but jumping to a high threshold after a few periods, and starting at a low threshold and gradually increasing the threshold over time (the "gradualism" treatment). We find that individuals coordinate most successfully at the high threshold in the gradualism treatment relative to the other two groups. We propose a theory based on belief updating to explain why gradualism works. We also discuss alternative explanations such as reinforcement learning, conditional cooperation, inertia, preference for consistency, and limited attention. Our findings point to a simple, voluntary mechanism to promote successful coordination when the capacity to impose sanctions is limited.

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination? (2020)
Working Paper: One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination? (2020)
Working Paper: One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination? (2019)
Working Paper: One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination? (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:feb:framed:00188

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