One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?

Maoliang Ye, Jie Zheng (), Plamen Nikolov and Sam Asher ()
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Jie Zheng: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, 100084 Beijing, China;

Management Science, 2020, vol. 66, issue 1, 113-129

Abstract: This study investigates a potential mechanism to promote coordination. With theoretical guidance using a belief-based learning model, we conduct a multiperiod, binary-choice, and weakest-link laboratory coordination experiment to study the effect of gradualism—increasing the required levels (stakes) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately—on group coordination performance. We randomly assign subjects to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, and starting at a low stake while gradually increasing the stakes over time (the Gradualism treatment). We find that relative to the other two treatments, groups coordinate most successfully at high stakes in the Gradualism treatment. We also find evidence that supports the belief-based learning model. These findings point to a simple mechanism for promoting successful voluntary coordination.

Keywords: gradualism; coordination; laboratory experiment; belief-based learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3210 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination? (2020)
Working Paper: One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination? (2019)
Working Paper: One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination? (2011)
Working Paper: One step at a time: Does gradualism build coordination? (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:66:y:2020:i:1:p:113-129

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