Incentive Spillovers in the Workplace: Evidence from Two Field Experiments
Erwin Bulte,
John List and
Daan van Soest
Framed Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website
Abstract:
Incomplete contracts are the rule rather than the exception, and any incentive scheme faces the risk of improving performance on incented aspects of a task at the detriment of performance on non-incented aspects. Recent research documents the effect of loss-framed versus gain-framed incentives on incentivized behavior, but how do such incentives affect overall performance? We explore potential trade-offs by conducting field experiments in an artificial "workplace". We explore two types of incentive spillovers: those contemporaneous to the incented task and those subsequent to the incented task. We report three main results. First, consonant with the extant literature, a loss aversion incentive induces greater effort on the incented task. Second, offsetting this productivity gain, we find that the quality of work decreases if quality is not specified in the incentive contract. Third, we find no evidence of harmful spillover effects to subsequent tasks; if anything, the loss aversion incentive induces more effort in subsequent tasks. Taken together, our results highlight that measuring and accounting for incentive spillovers are important when considering their overall impact.
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-eff, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Incentive spillovers in the workplace: Evidence from two field experiments (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:feb:framed:00727
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