The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions

Sander Onderstal, Florian Englmaier, Pablo Guillen, Loreto Llorente and Rupert Sausgruber
Additional contact information
Loreto Llorente: Departamento de Economía, Universidad Pública de Navarra

No 2004.10, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the ‘chopstick auction’ in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We analyze the chopstick auction with incomplete information both in theory and in a laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the chopstick auction is slightly less efficient but yields far more revenue than the second-price sealed-bid auction.

Keywords: Chopstick auction; Exposure problem; Laboratory experiment; Second-price sealed-bid auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mic
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/w ... oads/NDL2004-010.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions (2009)
Working Paper: The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.10

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alberto Prina Cerai ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).