Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders

Harry Paarsch and Bjarne Brendstrup
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Bjarne Brendstrup: Department of Economics, University of Aarhus

No 2004.11, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit sequential English auctions when bidder valuations are draws from different distributions; i.e., in the presence of asymmetries. When the identity of the winner as well as the number of units won by each bidder in previous stages of the auction are observed, we demonstrate nonparametric identification and then propose two estimation strategies, one based on the empirical distribution function of winning bids for the last unit sold and the other based on approximation methods using orthogonal polynomials. We apply our methods to daily data from fish auctions held in Grenå, Denmark. For single-unit supply, we use our estimates to compare the revenues a seller could expect to earn were a Dutch auction employed instead.

Keywords: Asymmetric; Multi-unit; Sequential; Oral; Ascending-price fish auctions; Dutch auctions; Nonparametric identification and estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D44 L1 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ecm
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Related works:
Working Paper: Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders (2004)
Working Paper: Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders (2004)
Working Paper: Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders (2004)
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