Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders

Harry Paarsch and Bjarne Brentstrup

No 36, Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit, sequential English auctions when bidder valuations are draws from different distributions; i.e., in the presence of asymmetries. When the identity of the winner as well as the number of units won by each bidder in previous stages of the auction are observed, we demonstrate nonparametric identification and then propose a semi-nonparametric estimator based on approximation methods using orthogonal polynomials. We apply our methods to daily data from fish auctions held in Grenaa, Denmark. For single-unit supply, we use our estimates to compare the revenues a seller could expect to earn were a Dutch auction employed instead

Keywords: nonparametric identification; semi-nonparametric estimation; asymmetric, sequential, English auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D44 L1 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-ecm and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders (2004)
Working Paper: Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders (2004)
Working Paper: Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders (2004)
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