Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

Carlo Carraro (), Johan Eyckmans () and Michael Finus ()

No 2005.50, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.

Keywords: Self-enforcing international environmental agreements; Climate policy; Transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H23 Q25 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.50

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