Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

Carlo Carraro (), Johan Eyckmans () and Michael Finus ()

No 2006_44, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements. However, the results achieved so far are overly specific. Therefore, we develop a more general framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a systematic way. We propose transfers using both internal and external financial resources for making �welfare optimal agreements� self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme, we use a stylized integrated assessment simulation model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.

Keywords: Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements; Climate Policy; Transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H23 Q25 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (132)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements (2005)
Working Paper: Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_44

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