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Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games

Dinko Dimitrov and Shao-Chin Sung
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Shao-Chin Sung: Aoyama Gakuin University

No 2008.98, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense.

Keywords: Additive Preferences; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity; Hedonic Games; NP-hard; NP-complete (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C70 C71 D02 D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Computational complexity in additive hedonic games (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games (2008) Downloads
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