Computational complexity in additive hedonic games

Shao-Chin Sung and Dinko Dimitrov

European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, vol. 203, issue 3, 635-639

Abstract: We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense.

Keywords: Additive; preferences; Coalition; formation; computational; complexity; Hedonic; games; NP-hard; NP-complete (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games (2008)
Working Paper: Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games (2008)
Working Paper: Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:203:y:2010:i:3:p:635-639

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