Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market

Yoshio Kamijo and Ryo Kawasaki
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Ryo Kawasaki: Tokyo Institute of Technology

No 2009.51, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.

Keywords: Indivisible Goods Market; Dynamics; Competitive Allocation; Strict Core; Foresight; Stable Set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ure
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market (2010)
Working Paper: Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.51

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