Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market

Yoshio Kamijo and Ryo Kawasaki

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010, vol. 46, issue 2, 214-222

Abstract: While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by the weak dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.

Keywords: Indivisible; goods; market; Dynamics; Competitive; allocation; Strict; core; Foresight; Stable; set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market (2009)
Working Paper: Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:2:p:214-222

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