Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players

Emiliya Lazarova and Dinko Dimitrov

No 2010.122, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.

Keywords: Coalitions; Core; Stability; Status-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players (2013)
Working Paper: Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.122

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