Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players

Emiliya Lazarova and Dinko Dimitrov

Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 40, issue 4, 1205-1229

Abstract: We study group formation by heterogeneous players when players’ preferences are dictated by status-seeking. Status can be intrinsic or associative. Considering these two types of status as either complements or substitutes results in non-emptiness of the core of the corresponding games and allows for a full characterization of the core stable outcomes. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-012-0659-1 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players (2010)
Working Paper: Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:4:p:1205-1229

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0659-1

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().