Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Frank H. Page Junior, Paulo Monteiro and Benar Fux Svaiter

No 537, FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) from EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil)

Abstract: Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution of the paper is methodological in nature. In particular, we identify conditions under which an auction model with multidimensional types can be reduced to a model with one dimensional types without loss of generality. Reduction results of this type have achieved the status of folklore in the mechanism design literature. Here, we provide a proof of the reduction result for auctions.

Date: 2004-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fgv:epgewp:537

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