Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Paulo Monteiro, Frank Page and Benar fux Svaiter

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, vol. 49, issue 1, 106-110

Abstract: Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion of types result.

Keywords: Optimal auctions; Types exclusion; Multidimensional types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:1:p:106-110

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.11.001

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