The major supervisory initiatives post-FDICIA: Are they based on the goals of PCA? Should they be?

Robert Eisenbeis () and Larry Wall

No 2002-31, FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Abstract: The prompt corrective action provisions in FDICIA 1991 provide the supervisors with an unambiguous goal: \"to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions at the least possible long-term cost to the deposit insurance fund.\" Yet performance of the regulators in achieving this goal has been lacking in that substantial losses continue to be imposed on the insurance funds when banks fail. Is PCA misguided, or are there incentive defects in the law and how the requirements are being administered? This paper analyzes these issues in the context of recent proposals to reform the deposit insurance system.

Keywords: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991; Financial institutions; Deposit insurance; Bank supervision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.atlantafed.org/-/media/documents/resea ... s/wp/2002/wp0231.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedawp:2002-31

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Rob Sarwark ().