Payments settlement under limited enforcement: Private versus public systems

Charles Kahn and William Roberds

No 2002-33, FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Abstract: What are the benefits provided by a payment system? What are the tradeoffs in public versus private payment systems and in restricted versus open payments arrangements? Modern payment systems encompass a variety of institutional designs with varying degrees of counterparty protection. We develop a framework which allows for an examination and comparison of payment systems and specification of conditions leading to their adoption. We relate these conditions to the design of present large-value payment systems (Fedwire, CHIPS, Target, etc.).

Keywords: Payment; systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Payments Settlement under Limited Enforcement: Private versus Public Systems (2004)
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