Discussion of Preston, "Learning about monetary policy rules when long-horizon expectations matter"
Seppo Honkapohja ()
No 2003-19, FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
The design of interest rate rules for conducting monetary policy have recently been examined for two key concerns. The first issue is determinacy of equilibria. Indeterminacy (multiplicity of stationary rational expectations equilibria) is a concern in models of monopolistic competition and price stickiness are currently a popular framework for the study of monetary policy. The second issue is stability of equilibria under adaptive learning. Some interest rate rules do not perform well when the expectations of the agents get out of equilibrium, e.g. as a result of structural shifts.
Keywords: Equilibrium (Economics); Monetary policy; Macroeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0319.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0319.pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedawp:2003-19
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Elaine Clokey ().