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Tax policy design in the presence of social preferences: some experimental evidence

Lucy Ackert, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Mark Rider

No 2004-33, FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Abstract: This paper reports the results of experiments designed to examine whether a taste for fairness affects people?s preferred tax structure. Building on the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, we devise a simple test for the presence of social preferences in voting for alternative tax structures. The experimental results show that individuals demonstrate concern for their own payoff and inequality aversion in choosing among alternative tax structures. However, concern for redistribution decreases when it leads to increasing deadweight losses. Our findings have important implications for the design of optimal tax theory.

Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:2004-33