A Quantitative Theory of Time-Consistent Unemployment Insurance

Yun Pei and Zoe Xie

No 2016-11, FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Abstract: During recessions, the U.S. government substantially increases the duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits through multiple extensions. This paper seeks to understand the incentives driving these increases. Because of the trade-off between insurance and job search incentives, the classic time-inconsistency problem arises. During recessions, the U.S. government substantially increases the duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits through multiple extensions. This paper seeks to understand the incentives driving these extensions. Because of the trade-off between insurance and job search incentives, the classic time-inconsistency problem arises. We endogenize a time-consistent UI policy in a stochastic equilibrium search model, where a government without commitment to future policies chooses the UI benefit level and expected duration each period. A longer duration increases the unemployed workers? consumption but reduces their job search incentives, leading to higher future unemployment. We use the framework to evaluate the effects of the 2008-2013 benefit extensions on unemployment and welfare.

Keywords: time-consistent policy; unemployment insurance; labor markets; business cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 H21 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2016-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ias, nep-lab, nep-mac and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: A quantitative theory of time-consistent unemployment insurance (2021)
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