Costly intermediation and the big push
Zsolt Becsi (),
Ping Wang and
Mark Wynne
No 98-16, FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Abstract:
Many existing theories of financial intermediation have difficulty explaining why financial activity can generate large real effects. This paper argues that the large real effects may reflect a multiplicity of equilibria. The multiple equilibria in this paper are generated by the dynamic interactions between the savings decisions of workers and the monopolistically competitive behavior of banks. We characterize the equilibria by showing the comparative-static responses of key aggregates to changes in the pure rate of time preference, investment uncertainty, and bank costs. We find that the results depend crucially on the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply and the aggregate level of employment. Small changes in the financial system may cause the economy to shift between low- and high-employment equilibria. The high-employment, high real interest rate equilibrium is consistent with the development experience of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan with repressed financial systems.
Keywords: Economic; development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Published in Journal of Development Economics, August 1999
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.atlantafed.org/-/media/documents/resea ... s/wp/1998/wp9816.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedawp:98-16
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Rob Sarwark ().