Central bank independence: what it is, what it isn’t – and the importance of accountability: remarks at the 2019 Annual Meeting of the Central Bank Research Association, Columbia University, New York, New York, July 19, 2019

Eric Rosengren ()

No 146, Speech from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Abstract: Central banks need not have independence with respect to the what ? the end goals, which are set by the elected representatives. But central banks should have independence with respect to the how ? the means of getting there.

Keywords: central bank independence; accountability; Congressional oversight; monetary policy; dual mandate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2019-07-19
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