Will greater disclosure and transparency prevent the next banking crisis?

Eric Rosengren ()

No 98-8, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Abstract: Greater transparency and disclosure of bank activities will not prevent banking crises unless appropriate monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies are also adopted. Nonetheless, greater disclosure of banking problems can reduce the costs of banking crises, even if transparency is not a panacea for preventing banking crises.

Keywords: Bank failures; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk, nep-ifn and nep-pke
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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