Impact of greater bank disclosure amidst a banking crisis

John S. Jordan, Joe Peek and Eric Rosengren ()

No 99-1, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Abstract: Banking crises have continued to emerge in recent years, contributing to severe economic contractions in Japan, Russia, and Southeast Asia. In response, international organizations have advocated enhanced market discipline, encouraging countries to improve disclosure. One reason so little progress has been made is that neither the proponents nor the opponents of enchanted disclosure policies have persuasive empirical evidence to support their views on potential costs and benefits of such a policy. This paper fills that gap by examining the impact of requiring the release of supervisory information on troubled U.S. banks during a severe banking crisis. We find that improving disclosure at troubled U.S. banks during the banking crisis was not destabilizing and did provide conditions for market discipline to work more effectively. These findings support the public policy proposal of enhanced bank disclosure, even at a time when experiencing a banking crisis.

Keywords: Bank supervision; Public policy; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk and nep-pke
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