Counterfeiting as private money in mechanism design

Ricardo Cavalcanti and Ed Nosal

No 716, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: We describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one which is difficult to monitor. Our approach, which amends the basic random-matching model of money in mechanism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. We show that it is not efficient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely. We do not appeal to lottery devices, and we argue that this is consistent with imperfect monitoring.

Keywords: Counterfeits and counterfeiting; Money (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design (2011)
Journal Article: Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design (2011)
Working Paper: Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0716

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DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-200716

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