Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design

Ricardo Cavalcanti and Ed Nosal

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2011, vol. 43, issue s2, 625-636

Abstract: We describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one that is difficult to monitor. Our approach, which amends the basic random‐matching model of money in mechanism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. We show that it is not efficient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely. We do not appeal to lottery devices, and we argue that this is consistent with imperfect monitoring.

Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00456.x

Related works:
Journal Article: Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design (2011)
Working Paper: Counterfeiting as private money in mechanism design (2007)
Working Paper: Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:43:y:2011:i:s2:p:625-636

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