Executive compensation: a calibration approach

Joseph Haubrich and Ivilina Popova

No 9416, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: A study that uses principal-agent theory to produce quantitative predictions about executive compensation, showing that observed incentives closely match optimal predicted incentives.

Keywords: Executives; -; Salaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Journal Article: Executive compensation: a calibration approach (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9416

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DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-199416

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